In the article on the origins of human rights regimes,
Andrew Moravscik sets forth the theory of republican liberalism. He uses the example of
postwar Europe to illustrate why this theory offers a better explanation
regarding the reasons for governments to construct such regimes, than realist
and ideational theories. First, he provides a general overview of these three
theories, which he then applies to the case of the European Convention on Human
Rights (ECHR). Cross- national patterns of national positions, the tactics used
in international negotiations and the domestic motivations and deliberations
are all discussed. He uses the United Kingdom (UK) as an example to support the
argument, after which he makes some remarks concerning generalization and the
dangers of holding onto the traditional Realist - Ideationalist dichotomy when
studying IR.
Moravcsik argues that regarding the motivations and
tactics used by states; the Realist point of view is that coercion is employed
by great powers to extent their ideals, either because of national pride or
geopolitical interest. Ideational theory regards altruistic governments and
groups as the promoters of perceived universal norms, thereby establishing the
process of the 'logic of appropriateness'. In this theory of republican liberalism, the
main motivation concerns the domestic future. Governments try to ‘lock in’
human rights policies, and by extension democracy, by binding the state to
international commitments. This should prevent the country from possibly
backsliding into oppression and international conflict. Human rights regimes are special regarding
the fact that they hold governments accountable for internal activities, and
because they offer individuals and groups, rather than states, the opportunity
to challenge these activities. In light of these characteristics and the
motivations that states can be expected to have, the case of the ECHR is discussed.
Even though the theoretical starting points are almost
opposite, Moravcsik argues that Realism and Ideationalism tend to converge in
their conclusion regarding state behaviour. Both strands expect the greatest power(s) to be the most
committed towards establishing human rights regimes, albeit for different
reasons. This was not the case in postwar Europe however. When measured against
willingness to accept compulsory jurisdiction of a court as well as the
possibility for individual petition, those who held most power (the United
States and the UK) were either not participating or non-committal during the
process. Moravcsik shows that national preferences appear to be better
predicted by the stability of the democracies concerned, as expected when
following the republican liberalist thought. Because the motivation is to lock
in future behaviour, newly democratized states can be expected to be most
committed. They face the greatest risk of backsliding, whilst established
democracies tend to feel confident about the future and therefore feel little
need to transfer sovereignty to an international jurisdiction. Moravcsik
considers Belgium, Denmark, Sweden, the Netherlands, Norway, the UK and
Luxembourg to be established democracies, and only Belgium was committed towards
establishing the ECHR. On the other hand, relatively new democracies such as
Austria, France, Italy, Germany, Iceland and Ireland were very committed
towards establishing a human rights regime. Non-democratic regimes have no
interest in human rights whatsoever, as could be expected. Ad hoc
explanations with variables such as the
possession colonies, a strong tradition of parliamentary sovereignty or a hang
towards European federalism can all be disproved.
Moravcsik also discusses which tactics states most
likely employ from the different theoretical points of view, and tests this
against the ECHR. Realist thinkers would argue that great powers either coerce
bribe weaker states, whilst ideational theory holds that persuasion would
likely be sufficient. According to republican liberalist theory, governments
can hardly be expected to change their position on such fundamental issues.
This seems to have been the case: "governments conducted a classical
international negotiation" (pp. 236), whereby practical compromises led to
an outcome close to the lowest common denominator whereby states could hold on
to their original positions. Concerning domestic deliberations, the same
argument can be made. There was no domestic discussion regarding the costs and
benefits of coercion, nor was there a significant amount of socialization for
human rights as an end. The new human rights regime was however considered to
be an instrument to promote the self-interested goal of stabilizing the
democracy, especially by young ones such as Italy and Germany. This is what can
be expected when following the republican liberalist thought.
The UK is than examined as a critical case, because it
is both the oldest and most firmly established democracy, as well as a great
power. And whilst its government offered support for international declatory
norms, it firmly opposed to binding legal obligations, centralized international institutions, the right of
individual petition and compulsory jurisdiction. The republican liberalist
explanation is that the state simply did not worry about the stability of its
democracy; and therefore saw no need to transfer sovereignty, since was afraid
of interference with domestic issues whilst its laws were virtually in
accordance with the proposals already.
Lastly, Moravcsik generalizes the findings towards
the origin and evolution of human rights regimes, as well as other issue-areas
in IR theory. Concerning the former, he concludes that "the tendency of
states to enhance the credibility of domestic policies by binding themselves to
international institutions may help explain" the enforcement of these
regimes. In general IR theory, republican liberalism shows that international
institutions might be best explained by regarding them to be the result of a
two-level game, whereby a decisive role lies in the domestic political
representation in world politics. Moravcsik ends by noting that the failure of
Realist theory does not automatically mean that Ideational theory is valid and
applicable, 'much more is required'.
